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The 1968 amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure' be-
came effective at midnight, September 30, 1968, and are applicable to all
civil actions either then pending or filed thereafter.' Substantial changes
in the rules will be indicated within the appropriate topic.'
I. COURTS, JUDGES, AND ATTORNEYS
A. Courts
In General Capital Corp. v. Tel Service Co.,4 the court held, inter
alia, that when the only purpose in temporarily relinquishing jurisdiction
was to enable the circuit court to review the applicability of a newly
enacted statute to the case as it then existed, the circuit court had no
jurisdiction to add two individual plaintiffs and enter a final amended
decree substituting them as beneficiaries.'
When a plaintiff-wife in a divorce action sought review of the circuit
court's denial of her motion to compel the defendant to return a minor
child to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, her petition for certiorari
was denied on the ground that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction since
the child was in a foreign jurisdiction at the time of the institution of the
action.' By dictum the court added that even if the circuit court had
jurisdiction, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that denial of her motion
was an abuse of judicial discretion.
B. Judges
In a case relating to the authority of successor judges,' on remand,
a circuit judge entered a decree ordering that divorced spouses each pay
one-half of the taxes and repairs on the marital home which had been
awarded to the wife. The appellate court held that a successor judge
could not order the divorced husband to bear the entire cost of repairs.'
This was held notwithstanding a reservation of jurisdiction contained in
the decree of the former circuit judge because the reservation "applies
1. All references to rules in the text will be to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
unless otherwise indicated.
2. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 211 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1968).
3. See Comment, Current Amendments to Florida Rules, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 815
(1969).
4. 212 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
5. Id. at 381.
6. Nieburger v. Nieburger, 214 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
7. ld. at 383-84.
8. Bailey v. Bailey, 204 So.2d 531 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
9. Id.
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to future factual situations, and not to retroactive reappraisals of prior
pronouncements."'10
C. Attorneys
Most of the cases in this area are related to attorney's fees and the
interest thereon. In an action brought by attorneys against their clients,
the circuit court denied the plaintiff's motion for a judgment n.o.v. On
appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, the lower court was reversed
with directions, holding that the attorneys were entitled to recover the
agreed upon amounts." On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida
modified and affirmed the district court in holding that a client who
acknowledged receipt of an attorney's bill for services and stated that he
would be able to pay it as soon as he received the anticipated income was
liable to the attorney for the amount acknowledged.' 2
In a case where a mortgage contained a provision that the mortgagor
would pay all costs including reasonable attorney's fees which the
mortgagee might incur in collection and made no distinction between
attorney's fees at the trial level and on appeal, the successful mortgagee-
appellees were entitled to an allowance for legal services on appeal."
In Mander v. Concreform Co., 4 a case of first impression in Florida,
the sole issue was whether attorney's fees awarded a successful workmen's
compensation claimant drew interest during the time the awards were
being appealed and before the fees were paid. The court held that interest
on the attorney's fees awarded was not allowable in the absence of a
provision authorizing such interest in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 5
When an award of attorney's fees in a divorce action was reduced on
appeal, however, both the trial court's allowance of interest on the
reduced award from the date of the original award and its refusal to set
off costs against the reduced attorney's fees were held not to be errone-
ous.
16
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
1 7
The recent cases in this area are generally concerned with the issue
of whether a Florida court had obtained jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation or individual.
10. Id. at 532.
11. Parker .v. Solar Research Corp., 210 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
12. Solar Research Corp. v. Parker, 221 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1969).
13. Empress Homes, Inc. v. Levin, 201 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
14. 206 So.2d 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
15. Id. at 663.
16. Novack v. Novack, 203 So.2d 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
17. The procedures and rules governing process and the service of process, including
substituted service and constructive service, are contained. in chapters 48 and 49 of the
Florida Statutes (1967).
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A. Activities Granting Long-Arm Jurisdiction
There have been several recent cases of prominence regarding
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals carrying on varied activities
in Florida. In O'Connell v. Loach,'8 which involved an action for a real
estate commission, the nonresident defendants had moved to dismiss and
their motion was denied by the circuit court. On an interlocutory appeal,
the case was reversed and remanded with leave to the plaintiff to amend
his complaint.'9 Amended pleadings and affidavits were filed. The non-
resident defendants were alleged to have bought and sold property in
Florida and to have listed a tract for sale with the plaintiff real estate
broker. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion
was denied. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were engaged in a
"business venture" within the statute authorizing jurisdiction over non-
residents engaged in business ventures in the state and that the claim
arose out of such business venture. The trial court was affirmed on an-
other interlocutory appeal.20
In McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co.,2 an order denying
the defendant's motion to quash service of process was affirmed. It was
held that an individual who came to Florida to participate in the pro-
ceeds of his uncle's estate, paid an attorney in Florida to represent him,
signed notes, endorsed checks, paid the balance of his uncle's account
at a hospital, and withdrew the contents of his uncle's safety deposit
box by signing the uncle's name, was engaged in acts for the purpose of
realizing "pecuniary benefit" within the state and was therefore within
the scope of the substituted service statute. 2
In Rumsch v. DeVaney,28 a medical malpractice suit, the distinc-
tion made in an earlier case 24 between practicing the profession of
medicine and engaging in business was preserved, and it was held that
the statutory method of effecting constructive service of process was
inapplicable to a nonresident physician.25
The purported service of process in Florida on an Israeli corpora-
tion, through its president, a Canadian citizen and a resident of Texas
who was not present in Florida on behalf of the corporation, was held
invalid.26 The corporation's only office was in England. The corporation
had never transacted business in Florida, had no resident agent here,
nor was it qualified to do business in Florida. In another third district
case, it was held that a foreign corporation which had entered a fran-
18. 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
19. O'Connell v. Loach, 194 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
20. O'Connell v. Loach, 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
21. 224 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
22. Id.
23. 218 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
24. Williams v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 199 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
25. Accord, Fine v. Snyder, 207 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
26. Goffer v. Weston, 217 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
27. Kastan v. Kastan, 222 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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chise agreement with a Florida land developer for the sale of Florida
land in foreign countries was not engaged in a business venture in
Florida" when the contracts were solicited, financed, and transacted in
foreign countries.
A foreign corporation was engaged in sufficient business within
the state to subject itself to service of process when it employed a
person who served as regional director of the corporation's wholly owned
subsidiaries in the state, directed the activities of other supervisors,
visited offices of the subsidiaries, and had authority to hire and fire
their managers.29 Similarly, when the defendant hardware manufacturer
sent its officers, engineers, and salesmen into Florida and the plaintiff's
damages resulted from the sale and delivery of defective hardware, the
obligation of the nonresident corporate defendant to the plaintiff was
held to be sufficiently connected with the defendant's activities within
the state to permit substituted service." When the defendant corpora-
tion was doing business in the state at the time of the plaintiff's injury,
substituted service under the long-arm statute was effective against it,
even though at the time of such service the corporation did not maintain
minimal business contacts within the state."
B. Nonresident Motor Vehicle Owners or Operators
Nonresident motor vehicle owners or operators appoint the secretary
of state as their agent for service of process in any civil action "arising out
of or by reason of any accident or collision occurring within the state in
which the motor vehicle is involved. '8 2 This statute, however, is not
applicable where nonresident defendants conceal their whereabouts. In
such instances, mailing of notice of service on the secretary of state and
a copy of process by registered mail is not necessary,"3 nor will the
plaintiff's inability to file the defendant's return receipt prevent the
court from acquiring jurisdiction.14 When the defendants do not conceal
their whereabouts, however, there must be strict compliance with the
method of substituted service provided by statute.8 5 Thus, when the
plaintiff's affidavits failed to show any connection between the defendant
and the address to which the plaintiff chose to send the letter containing
process, the circuit court's order denying defendant's motion to quash
service of process should be reversed. 8
The nonresident motorist's service statute, which provides for sub-
28. Engaging in business in the state constitutes an appointment of the secretary of
state as an agent on whom process may be served. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1967).
29. Dickinson v. Gracy, 210 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
30. Hubsch Mfg. Co. v. Freeway Washer & Stamping Co., 205 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1967).
31. Masters, Inc. v. Corley, 222 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
32. FLA. STAT. § 48.171 (1967).
33. Richardson v. Williams, 201 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
34. Fernandez v. Chamberlain, 201 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
35. FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1967).
36. Green v. Nashner, 216 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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stituted service in "any civil action" arising out of an automobile acci-
dent, was interpreted to include contract actions as well as tort actions
in Marion County Hospital District v. Namer.17 Thus, that case held
substituted service of process under the statute to be proper in an action
by a hospital against a nonresident for services rendered in treatment
of injuries received in an automobile accident in Florida. 8
C. Constructive Service of Process
Although substituted service on the secretary of state as pro-
vided by statute is often loosely referred to as constructive service,
rule 1.070(g) clearly indicates that constructive service refers specifi-
cally to service by publication." In a first district case, the plaintiff
corporation sued a domestic corporation which had no offices, officers,
or agents in the state. The cause was dismissed on the grounds that
service of process by publication was improper and insufficient. On
appeal, the case was reversed and remanded. The court held that where
the plaintiff's attorney filed the sworn statement required by statute
and indicated, after diligent search, that the current addresses of the
president and resident agent of defendant were in New York, in absence
of contrary proof, this was sufficient to show that personal service
could not be obtained and plaintiff was entitled to use the statutory
constructive service procedure by publication.' In Brown v. Blake,4 1
an action was brought by a resident stockholder of a closely held
Florida corporation against a nonresident stockholder to determine the
ownership of certain shares of stock. The defendant's motion to dismiss
was denied and an interlocutory appeal was taken. The plaintiff-appellee
contended that such a suit was primarily of an in rem nature, and no
jurisdiction had been acquired by constructive service of process. 42 The
court concluded that the suit was a "quasi in rem proceeding" which
might rest on constructive service, and it affirmed the trial court's denial
of the defendant's motion to dismiss.45
D. Substituted Service of Process
The defense of insufficiency of service of process is one which may
be made by motion at the option of the pleader. 44 In Viking Superior
37. 225 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
38. Id.
39. Rule 1.070(e) also states that service by publication may be made as provided
by statute, and chapter 49 of the Florida Statutes, [formerly chapter 48] governing service
of process by publication, is entitled "CoNSTRUCTrVE SERVICE OF PROCESS" and is separate
from chapter 48 which contains, inter alia, the rules and procedures governing substituted
service.
40. Day-Tona Seabreeze, Inc. v. Thunderbird Operating Corp., 207 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1968). See FLA. STAr. § 49.011 et seq. (1967).
41. 212 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
42. The primary point on appeal was one of jurisdiction that had "never been decided
by a reported Florida decision." Id. at 49.
43. Id.
44. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.140(b).
1970]
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Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co.,45 a motion to quash service of process was
filed by the nonresident manufacturer along with its affidavit that it
was not qualified to do business and had not transacted business in
Florida. No affidavit in support of the validity of the substituted service
of process on the defendant manufacturer was submitted by the plaintiff.
The trial court denied the manufacturer's motion to quash service
stating that his affidavits were insufficient since he was not "personally
present and available for cross-examination. '46 The order was reversed
and the cause remanded on an interlocutory appeal because affidavit
proof is an acceptable method of supporting a motion and is not insuffi-
cient merely because of the absence of the affiant.4 7 Another case ruled
that to sustain the burden of showing that a situation justifies substi-
tuted service in lieu of personal service, the plaintiff must substantiate
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint by affidavits or other proof.48
III. VENUE
A. In General
Venue refers to the geographical area in which a defendant may
be sued or tried; it differs from jurisdiction, which refers to the power
of a court to hear and determine a cause.49 The venue rules in Florida
are provided for by statute.50 Suits may generally be commenced
"where defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or
where the property in litigation is located . . .. I
In a divorce action, the denial of the defendant's motion to transfer
to another county was affirmed on interlocutory appeal.5z The court held
that the part of the statute providing that a suit may be brought in the
county where the cause of action accrued was complied with when some
of the acts alleged as grounds for a divorce occurred in the county where
the action was brought.
In an action against an issuing bank on a dishonored cashier's check,
the denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue was reversed.5 The
court held that the statute54 providing that actions be brought only in the
county or district where a domestic corporation has or usually keeps a
business office, where the cause of action accrued, or where property in
litigation is located, precluded action on the dishonored cashier's check
in a county other than that in which the issuing bank was located.
45. 212 So.2d 331 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
46. Id. at 333.
47. Id. at 334.
48. Hydronaut, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 208 So.2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
49. F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDuaE 616-619 (1965).
50. FLA. STAT. ch. 47 (1967).
51. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1967).
52. Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
53. Bank of Hallandale v. Joe W. Sullivan's Concrete Serv., Inc., 216 So.2d 260 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1968).
S4. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1967).
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The general venue statutes are not necessarily all-inclusive. They
may be limited by other statutes providing civil relief under varying
circumstances.5 5 Thus, when a former husband sought to establish a
foreign divorce decree and to modify certain provisions thereof, it was
held that the question of venue was controlled by the modification
statute under which the instant proceeding was filed.5" The relevant
statute fixed venue in the county where either party resided. Thus, the
action was permissibly instituted in the county of the former husband's
residence and the transfer of the suit to the county of the former wife's
residence was improper.57 Also, it has been held that the third-party prac-
tice rule5 did not deprive a city from invoking its common law right to be
sued only in the county in which it is located. 9
B. Change of Venue
When it appears that an action is pending in the wrong court or
that an action is filed laying venue in the wrong county or district,, the
judge may transfer the action to the proper court in accordance with the
venue statutes.60 In State. ex. rel. McGreevy v. Dowling,6 the county
judge's court had power to deal with probate matters; however it was an
unlawful exercise of its jurisdiction to entertain a probate proceeding
when the initial petition showed facts which established that venue for
such proceeding was not in that county and was fixed by law in another
county.62 In University Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Light-
bourn,6" the defendant requested a writ of certiorari to review an order
denying its motion to reopen and vacate a default judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs. When the Circuit Court of Broward County had entered
the order, it had also granted defendant's motion for change of venue to
Dade County. The Fourth District Court of Appeal transferred the defen-
dant's petition to the third district, holding that after transfer of venue
from Broward County to Dade County, the circuit court in Dade County
became the only trial court possessing the power to vacate default, and
.thus any appellate correction would necessarily be directed to the circuit
court in Dade County. Therefore, the Third District Court of Appeal had
jurisdiction.64 The power to make such a transfer is specifically author-
ized by the Florida Appellate Rules.65
55. See, e.g., Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) (bastardy action).
56. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1967).
57. Stewart v. Carr, 218 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
58. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a).
59. City of Bradenton v. Finley, 208 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
60. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060.
61. 223 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
62. FLA. STAT. § 732.06 (1967). This is another example of a specific venue statute
(governing probate) limiting the general venue statute.
63. 201 So.2d 568 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
64. Id. Dade County is in the Third Appellate District while Broward County. is in
the Fourth Appellate District.
65. FLA. App. R. 2.1(a)(5)(d).
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C. Contractual Relationships
The defendant violated a contract to convey land to the plaintiff.
The question presented was whether the plaintiff-purchaser could bring
an action for specific performance of the contract in the county where the
land was located rather than in the county where the defendant-vendor
resided. The district court affirmed the circuit court's denial of defendant's
motions to dismiss and for change of venue, holding that since the com-
plaint indicated that real property was involved, venue was properly laid
in the county where the property was located. 6
The defendant corporation executed and delivered a note to the
plaintiff bank. The note was endorsed by other individual defendants. The
corporation and the individual defendants resided in one county. Renewal
notes were made in another county by its residents. In an action on the
note,6 7 the court held that the plaintiff was free to elect venue where the
note was signed or where the maker resided.6" In another action by an
assignee of a debt for which there was no specific place of payment
named, the court held that the assignee may bring the action in the
county of the assignor's principal place of business, since by virtue of the
assignment he stands in the shoes of the assignor. 9
D. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, codified by federal statute, 0
is based on equitable considerations and is applied in the trial court's
discretion to prevent the imposition upon its jurisdiction of those causes
which, for the convenience of the litigants and in the interest of justice,
should have been instituted in another forum.71 The general principle in
Florida is that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable when
the cause of action arises in another jurisdiction and neither party to the
action resides in Florida. 2
When a railroad, although a foreign corporation, maintained its
principal place of business in Florida and the Federal Employers Liability
Act (under which this action was brought) provided for venue at the
place where a corporation has an office for transacting its customary
business, it was held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismiss-
ing the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. 73
66. Sales v. Berzin, 212 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
67. See FLA. STAT. § 47.061 (1967) for the specific venue provisions governing promis-
sory notes.
68. Papy v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat'l Bank, 204 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
69. Gorham Constr. Co. v. Superior Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 218 So.2d 516 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1969).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
71. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
72. Southern Ry. v. McCubbins, 196 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So.2d 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
73. Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 224 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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In Ganem v. Issa,74 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff's affidavits tended to
demonstrate that the defendant was a resident of Florida, and the de-
fendant failed to file supporting affidavits with his motion. The defendant
could show no evidence in opposition to plaintiff's contention, nor could he
sustain his burden of showing that a more convenient forum was avail-
able, so that prosecution in the present forum would be so impracticable
or inconvenient that he would be denied a fair trial. Therefore his motion
was denied.75
In a tort action arising out of an accident in Peru, where plaintiff's
decedents were not residents of the United States and had no contact with
the United States, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was clearly
applicable, and the action was held to have been properly dismissed.78
The Florida Statutes were recently amended by adding section
47.122, which authorizes change of venue for the convenience of parties
or witnesses or in the interest of justice."
IV. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. Statute of Limitations
The basic Florida Statute dealing with limitations is section 95.11,
which provides for limitations on actions other than those for the re-
covery of real property. The statute is clear as to the number of years
within which an action must be brought. The problem is determining
when a cause of action accrues, i.e., what event triggers the running
of the statute.
In an action by an insured against his liability insurer to recover the
expenses incurred by the former in defending an action by a third party,
the defendant insurer was correct in his contention that since the insur-
ance contract was not under seal, a five-year limit applied.7" It was held,
however, that the insured's cause of action accrued when the third-party
litigation ended rather than on the earlier date when the insurer denied
coverage, and summary judgment for the insured was affirmed."9
In Barrantine v. Vulcan Materials Co.,80 the plaintiff's original
complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. When the plaintiff
brought suit again, the court held that the running of the four-year
statute of limitations on a personal injury claim" was not tolled during
74. 225 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
75. Id. at 565.
76. Faulkner v. S.A. Empresa de Viaco Airea Rio Grandense, 222 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969).
77. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-83, amending FLA. STAT. 47.122 (1965).
78. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1967).
79. Continental Cas. Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 222 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969).
80. 216 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
81. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1967).
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the pendency of the plaintiff's original complaint. Thus, the time during
which that action was in litigation could not be deducted from the total
elapsed time in determining whether the action was barred by the
statute.
82
A housekeeper brought an action against the executor of her de-
ceased employer for compensation for services rendered over a period of
three years, ending approximately six months before the decedent's death.
The executor argued that the judgment should be limited to damages for
services rendered within one year before the death by virtue of the statute
which provides that suits for the recovery of wages shall be brought
within one year. 3 The court held, however, that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover for the entire value of her services, since in terms of a contract
for continuous services over an indefinite period of time, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the employment ends, at which
time the cause of action accrues.84
Creviston v. General Motors Corp.85 was an action for breach of
implied warranty for injuries sustained by a buyer when the door fell off
his refrigerator. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, based on the running of the
statute of limitations" from the date of purchase.8 7 The Supreme Court
of Florida quashed and remanded, concluding that the three-year statute
of limitations in an action based on implied warranty begins to run from
the time the plaintiff "first discovered, or reasonably should have dis-
covered the defect constituting the breach of warranty."8 8 This holding
has been applied to a similar action based on a malfunctioning glass
coffee pot.8 9 It should be noted that these cases involved pre-Uniform
Commercial Code lawY0
B. Res Judicata
Similar to the statute of limitations, res judicata is an affirmative
defense which must be pleaded." The broad term, res judicata, "covers
all the ways in which a judgment in one action will have a binding effect
in another. 92 These various techniques include collateral estoppel, bar,
and merger.93 There have been several cases in this area during the
82. Barrantine v. Vulcan Materials Co., 216 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
83. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(7)(b) (1967).
84. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Borbiro, 201 So.2d 571 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
85. 225 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1969).
86. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(e) (1967).
87. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 210 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
88. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331, 333 (Fla. 1969).
89. Hendon v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 225 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
90. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725.
91. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). An affirmative defense not pleaded is waived. FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.140(h). See Aufseher v. Aufseher, 217 So.2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
92. F. JAMES, Crnvr. PROCEDURE 549 (1965).
93. Id. at 550, which explains the distinctions between these terms. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal has utilized this explanation in a recent opinion. Wacaster v. Wacaster,
220 So.2d 914, 915-16 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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survey period. In discussing these cases, the terminology of the courts
will be used, bearing in mind that the courts do not always make the
distinctions between the subcategories within the general concept of res
judicata.
In an action challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance govern-
ing billboards, it was held that a prior ruling 4 had sustained the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance and the plaintiff, having participated in the
prior cause, was barred from pursuing this attack by the doctrine of res
judicata. 5 An exception to the res judicata rule arose out of the applica-
tion of Florida Statutes section 46.0896 which prohibited the joining of an
action in replevin with any other cause of action. It was held by virtue of
this statute that an action by a seller against the guarantor of a condi-
tional sales contract did not violate the rule against splitting of causes of
action, notwithstanding the fact that it was commenced after the seller
brought an action in replevin against the buyer.97 Citing this second
district case, the third district held that a suit by the buyer of billiard
equipment for breach of oral warranty was not barred by estoppel by
judgment, res judicata, or the compulsory counterclaim rule, even though
the suit was commenced after the seller had already obtained final judg-
ment in replevin against the buyer.98 The Supreme Court of Florida later
affirmed the decision of the third district. 9
In an action brought by a truck driver against a motorist for damages
from a collision, the motorist filed a counterclaim to which the truck
driver asserted the defense of res judicata. In a prior suit, the motorist
sued the truck driver and truck owner for damages and injuries, and both
defendants counterclaimed. The truck driver and motorist voluntarily
dismissed their claims against each other without prejudice. The trial
resulted in jury verdict and judgment was entered for the truck owner on
the motorist's claim and for the motorist on the counterclaim. In the
instant case, the court held the truck driver had a defense of res judicata
against the motorist's counterclaim, since in the prior suit the motorist
chose to fully litigate his claim against the owner but excluded the
driver.100 In contrast, the defenses of res judicata and estoppel by judg-
ment were not available in a garnishment action against liability insurers
of the driver and owner of an automobile, where a prior personal injury
action had been brought against both, but then voluntarily dismissed
against the owner. Since the action was dismissed against the owner, the
94. State ex rel. Boozer v. City of Miami, 193 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
95. Metropolitan Dade County v. E.B. Elliott Adv. Co., 214 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969). The court also applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. at 512.
96. FLA. STAT. § 46.08 (1965) provided that "replevin and ejectment shall not be
joined together nor with other causes of action." The 1967 statutes do not contain this
provision.
97. Goranson v. Maximo Moorings Marine Center, Inc., 204 So.2d 745 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
98. Maco Supply Corp. v. Masciarelli, 213 So.2d 265 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
99. Masciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1969).
100. Racino v. Saxon, 222 So.2d 274 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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issue of permissive use was not litigated. Therefore, the driver's insurer
in the present suit could not use the defenses of res judicata and estoppel
by judgment.1 1
Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude litigation of issues
which have been conclusively answered by a court in litigation between
the parties, even where the litigation was in another state. 10 2 Thus, where
several counts are alleged in a complaint, these doctrines operate only to
bar the ones considered in a prior action, and not to bar a count which
stands on a different footing. °8 Even the use of evidence of actions prior
to a former judgment may be barred by the res judicata doctrine in a
subsequent action.0 4
V. PLEADINGS
A. Complaint
A complaint or any other pleading which seeks relief "must state
a cause of action" and contain "a short and plain statement of the ulti-
mate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . "10l Mere legal
conclusions are insufficient to state a cause of action unless substantiated
by allegations of ultimate fact.'06 In determining the sufficiency of a
complaint, affirmative defenses appearing on its face are to be considered
for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action." 7
The courts employed this practice even before the effective date of the
rule to that effect.'08
Certain matters must be specially pleaded. 9 For instance, when the
count of a third-party complaint alleged fraud"0 and conspiracy, but the
only reference to any overt act by one third-party defendant was that it
"aided and abetted in the conspiracy," the count should have been dis-
missed."' Special damages must be specifically stated or evidence as to
them is inadmissible."l 2 Thus, when building owners requested compensa-
tion for physical injury to their building, but the pleadings were silent as
to the element of personal inconvenience, special damages for such in-
convenience could not be recovered."8
101. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jozwick, 204 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
102. Puro v. Puro, 225 So.2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (prior litigation in New York).
103. See Super Serv. Prod. Corp. v. North Store Corp., 214 So.2d 664 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968).
104. See Telford v. Telford, 225 So.2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
105. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b).
106. Doyle v. Flex, 210 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). See note 91 supra.
108. Douglas v. City of Dunedin, 202 So.2d 787 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
109. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120.
110. "In all averments of fraud . . . , the circumstances constituting fraud . . .
shall be stated with such particularity as the circumstances may permit." FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.120(b).
111. General Dynamics Corp. v. Hewitt, 225 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(g).
113. Bialkowicz v. Pan American .Condominium No. 3, Inc., 215 So.2d 767 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1968).
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The Supreme Court of Florida in Ferrell Jewelers of Tampa, Inc. v.
Southern Mill Creek Products Co. 1 4 adopted the third district's opinion
that it is unnecessary to plead inferences or facts necessarily implied
from other facts stated as to a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
an adversary." 5 Thus, it was unnecessary for the bailor, who alleged in
the complaint that property belonging to him was stored for payment of
consideration in the bailee's warehouse and destroyed while in the bailee's
custody and control, to allege negligence on the part of the bailee." 61
In the last survey, 1 7 the authors commented that one of the most
significant additions to the 1967 Rules of Civil Procedure was the pro-
posed forms for use in conjunction with the rules. They also opined that
"the practitioner would be wise, and safe, by fully utilizing the new
forms.""" The wisdom of their statement was borne out soon thereafter
when it was held that a complaint utilizing the language of the proposed
forms" 9 was sufficient to state a cause of action for divorce on the ground
of extreme cruelty. 20
B. Counterclaims and Cross-Claims
A pleader must state as a counterclaim any claim against an oppos-
ing party which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.' He is also permitted,
but not required, to state a counterclaim not arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence.' 22 The court of original jurisdiction may ex-
amine the counterclaim to determine whether, on its face, it contains
allegations which state an enforceable claim,'23 even though such claim
be permissive or compulsory, 24 and to determine whether the cause
should be transferred to a court of higher jurisdiction. 25 Thus, when a
lessor filed in the civil court of record to recover a money judgment and
his lessee, the defendant, counterclaimed for affirmative equitable relief,
exclusive jurisdiction for which was vested in the circuit court, the civil
court of record committed reversible error by refusing to transfer the
cause to the circuit court.'
26
A cross-claim may be filed against a coparty if it arises out of the
114. 205 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1967).
115. Adelman v. M. & S. Welding Shop, 105 So.2d 802 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
116. Ferrell Jewelers v. Southern Mill Creek Prods. Co., 205 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1967).
117. Massey & Bridges, CIVI PROCEDURE, 22 U. MIAmI L. R. v. 449 (1968).
118. Id. at 463.
119. FLA. R. Civ. P. FoRM 1.943 was traced in this case.
120. Muller v. Muller, 205 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). See FLA. STAT. § 65.04(4)(1965).
121. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). For one court's construction of "opposing party," see
Hall v. McDonough, 216 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
122. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b).
123. State ex rel. Peters v. Hendry, 159 Fla. 210, 31 So.2d 254 (1947); Platt v.
Kenco Chem. Co., 132 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
124. State ex rel. Rosenfeld v. Boyer, 145 So.2d 547 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
125. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j).
126. Davis v. Flato, 210 So.2d 16 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
claim or a counterclaim.1 17 Chappell v. Scarborough28 presents a question
of first impression in Florida, seeking a construction of rule 1.170(g) "as
it relates to the right of a defendant to file a cross-claim against a co-
party on a cause of action arising out of a contract of indemnity against
liability."' 29 A father brought an action for the wrongful death of his
child against the vendor and purchaser of an electrical services business.
The sales contract between the defendants provided that the vendor
would perform the remaining work under a subcontract so as to create
no liability in the purchaser. This agreement was held to constitute a
contract of indemnity against any liability which might be imposed on
the purchaser as a result of negligent performance of his subcontract. It
was further held that the purchaser's cause of action for indemnification
could be brought by way of cross-claim and was not barred or postponed
until judgment had been rendered against him in the original action. 30
C. Amended Pleadings
Rule 1.190 sets forth the procedures for the amendment of pleadings,
stating that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."' 3 ' For
instance, when plaintiff's counsel, appealing from the dismissal of his
complaint, consented to four extensions of time as a courtesy to the
defense counsel, and by the time the court filed its opinion holding that
the complaint was defective but curable the statute of limitations had
run, the plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint notwithstanding the
expiration of the statutory period.' 2 At any time and at every stage,
"the court must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."'13 However, amend-
ment has been held not to be proper in the trial court after reversal of
judgment by a reviewing court and entry of another judgment in favor
of one of the parties.' 8"
Since the trial court has broad discretion in allowing amendments,
the appellant has the burden of showing an abuse of that discretion.'3 5
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in a divorce action to
deny the husband's motion to amend his complaint to include adultery
when he did not make the motion until the conclusion of his case but
knew of the allegedly adulterous conduct prior to filing his complaint and
had introduced evidence of it in support of his allegation of extreme
127. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g).
128. 224 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
129. Id. at 795.
130. Chappel v. Scarborough, 224 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
132. Drady v. City of Tampa, 215 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
133. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(e).
134. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 206 So.2d 688 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
135. McSwiggan v. Edwards, 186 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See Walker v. Narose
Bldgs., Inc., 206 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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cruelty.186 However, it was an abuse of discretion to grant a plaintiff's
motion to amend, which was filed at a conference on requested jury in-
structions after all the evidence had been presented, and such amendment
was fatally defective when the motion was granted without giving the
defendant an opportunity to offer a case in opposition.
87
Since the general rule is that leave to amend should be freely given,
doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendment. Thus, in a
case where an injured minor's amended complaint failed to state a cause
of action under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the minor should have
been granted leave to amend since amendment could have been ac-
complished without any departure from facts already alleged.' Also,
permitting a plaintiff to amend by reducing his claim for damages to an
amount within the jurisdiction of the court conformed to the general
policy indicated by the rules.1
8 9
The rule governing amended and supplemental pleadings also pro-
vides for amendments to conform with the evidence, treating issues not
pleaded but tried by the express or implied consent of the parties as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. 4 ° Thus, where evidence of a de-
fense based on the Statute of Frauds appeared in the record, it was
reversible error to deny the defendant's motion to amend his pleadings
to conform with the evidence. 4' However, when there was nothing in the
record from which it could be inferred that a quantum meruit issue had
been tried by express or implied consent of the parties, there was no
abuse of discretion in denying a motion to amend pleadings to conform
with such issue after judgment in favor of the defendant. 42
When an amendment arises "out of the conduct, transaction or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original pleading."'48
This rule of "relation back" is important for purposes of the statute of
limitations. Thus, in an action against doctors for breach of oral contract
and negligence, an amended complaint which added counts based on
failure to obtain parental consent to an operation on a minor was not
barred by the statute of limitations, notwithstanding the fact that the
date of such operation was not referred to in the original complaint.'44
VI. PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
The rule governing pretrial procedure provides that "the court may
of its own motion or shall on motion of any party .. .require the at-
136. Wooten v. Wooten, 213 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
137. Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. Linee Aeree Italiane, 212 So.2d 109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
138. Petterson v. Concrete Constr., Inc., 202 So.2d 191 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
139. Steingold v. L. & L. Motors, Inc., 207 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
140. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).
141. Trans World Marine Corp. v. Threlkeld, 201 So.2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
142. Triax, Inc. v. City of Treasure Island, 208 So.2d 669 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
144. Brown v. Wood, 202 So.2d 125 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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torneys for the parties to appear before it for conference .... ,'45 In the
case of Coggan v. Coggan,'4 it was held that a pretrial conference is a
"hearing" within the rule that a motion may not be made orally except at
a "trial or hearing,"' 47 and an order based on oral motion at the pretrial
conference was affirmed. When a party's attorney fails to attend a pre-
trial conference, "the court may dismiss the suit or strike the answer or
take such action as justice requires."' 4 Thus, when the defendant had
already failed to appear at two regularly scheduled pretrial conferences
and then failed to respond to an order directing him to appear for a pre-
trial conference, striking defendant's answer, entering a default order,
and holding trial on damages only was not error.149
Among the purposes of pretrial procedure are simplification of
issues and, ultimately, control of the subsequent course of the action.
When settlements or stipulations"5 are made before trial, they should
control unless modifications are made at trial to prevent injustice. In
Stephenson v. Collins, 5' the issue of compensatory damages was settled
prior to trial by mutual agreement between the parties. After the counts
relating to compensatory damages were dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to stipulation, the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was properly dis-
missed, since "the right to recover for punitive damages is directly de-
pendent upon the right to recover for compensatory damages, a right
which no longer existed after the compromise and settlement.' ' 152 In
Giblin v. City of Coral Gables,'53 a stipulation was made and approved
by the circuit court before the plaintiff's death pending litigation. Since
this stipulation provided that the basic issues in the lawsuit would be de-
termined in a companion action by plaintiff's wife against the city, an
appellate determination adverse to her in the companion case precluded
her recovery as administratrix in the plaintiff's action.'5
VII. PARTIES
This area has been of great significance during the survey period,
especially in relation to joinder of parties under Rule 1.210. Perhaps,
the most talked about case of the past year was Shingleton v. Bussey,'55
the leading case on joinder of a liability insurer as a party defendant.
Suit was brought against the insured and her liability insurer for
damages the plaintiff sustained from the alleged negligent operation of
the insured automobile. The circuit court dismissed the insurer as a party,
145. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
146. 213 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
147. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b).
148. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
149. Ross v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
150. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.030(d).
151. 210 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
152. Id. at 736.
153. 206 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
154. Id.
155. 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
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but the First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, construing
rule 1.210(a) to permit such joinder. 5 ' The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the judgment of the first district on the merits, specifically hold-
ing that the plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary of the motor vehicle
policy, had a direct cause of action, similar to the insured, against the
insurer as a party defendant.' 5' Since it emphasized this aspect to a
greater extent than the district court, the supreme court undertook a
thorough explanation of the rationale of the third-party beneficiary
theory.158
Some of the difficulties involved in this case stem from the fact that
although the holding is relatively narrow, the underlying policy behind
it is broad, and the decision is therefore fraught with potentially far-
reaching implications. To complicate matters, there is an abundance of
dicta. For instance, the court makes a statement relating to the value
of "a candid admission at trial of the existence of insurance coverage
* . . [and] the policy limits . . . . "' Furthermore, the court was of the
opinion that unless the legislature gives them the right to insert "no
joinder" clauses, "there is no basis in law for insurers to assume they
have such contractual right . . . ."'" Neither of these statements is re-
lated to the holding of the court.
The basis for the decision in Shingleton v. Bussey is one of policy-
that of liberal construction of joinder rules in order to prevent multiplicity
in litigation. The court stresses that among the fundamental goals of
modern procedural jurisprudence is the goal of securing "a method of
providing an efficient and expeditious adjudication of the rights of persons
possessing adverse interests in a controversy."' 61 The importance of this
policy basis becomes evident in Highland Insurance Co. v. Walker
Memorial Sanitarium & Benevolent Association,'6' where the second
district cites not only the Shingleton case, but also the policy just articu-
lated.'63 Extending the liberality of the permissive joinder rule l6 4 even
further, the second district held that joinder of a hospital and two doctors,
residing in different counties in a medical malpractice action brought in
the county of one doctor's residence avoided the necessity of several
suits, served the interest of expediency, and was proper even though
the alleged negligent acts were not concurrent and arose in different
counties. 65
156. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). For an excellent
discussion of the opinion of the first district, see Note, 23 U. MiAmi L. REv. 652 (1969).
157. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1968).
158. Id. at 715-16, where the court quotes extensively from Gothberg v. Nemerovski,
58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12 (1965).
159. Id. at 718.
160. Id. at 719.
161. Id. at 718.
162. 225 So.2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
163. Id. at 574-75.
164. FiA. R. Csv. P. 1.210(a).
165. Highland Ins Co. v. Walker Mem. San. & Ben. Ass'n, 225 So.2d 572 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1969).
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In Jefferson Realty v. United States Rubber Co., 66 the Supreme
Court of Florida was faced with the question of whether a parent cor-
poration was properly joined as a party plaintiff in an action brought by
its subsidiaries against the defendant for breach of agreements to lease.
The joinder was held to be proper in view of the fact that the parent
corporation was the "real party in interest,"'0 7 recognized as such by
all parties, and even though the joinder did not take place until the last
day of testimony.168
VIII. INTERVENTION
"Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time
be permitted to assert his right by intervention .... "I Pending litigation
means "litigation pending before the trial court.' 70 In view of this inter-
pretation and a general rule that intervention may not be allowed after
final judgment, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the state comp-
troller, a stranger to the record and not aggrieved by the decision, would
not be permitted to intervene for purposes of appeal after a final decree
since the final judgment did not clearly bind him.17 1
Although intervention after final decree is generally not allowed,
Florida law recognizes an exception created in the "interest of justice."'1 72
In Kearney v. Saline, the court held that the ends of justice required that
petitioning taxpayers be allowed to intervene in an action which originally
sought a reassessment of property, but which in effect became an action
to increase taxes by court order.178 The order, entered on the petition of
the intervening Board of Public Instruction, enjoined the assessor from
certifying a ratio for the reduction of millage, thereby in effect doubling
the millage. Furthermore, "there was no true adversary proceeding be-
cause the original plaintiffs aligned themselves with all other parties on
one side of the issue . . .174
The interests of an intervenor are generally in subordination to the
main proceeding. 75 Thus, an intervenor is bound by the record at the
time of his intervention. 76 For the same reason, it is not an abuse of the
166. 222 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969).
167. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a). This "real party in interest" concept was the basis for
the district court's decision in Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968):
see Note, 23 U. MiAmi L. REV. 652, 654-56 (1969).
168. Jefferson Realty v. United States Rubber Co., 222 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969). See
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b), 1.250.
169. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.230.
170. Dickenson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 1969).
171. Id.
172. Wags Transp. Sys. v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1956).
173. 208 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
174. Id. at 651.
175. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.230.
176. Krouse v. Palmer, 131 Fla. 444, 179 So. 762 (1938); Florida Gas Co. v. American
Employer's Ins. Co., 218 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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trial court's discretion to deny leave to intervene where new issues are
sought to be injected.177
IX. INTERPLEADER
If there is a danger of exposing the plaintiff to multiple liability,
persons with claims against him may be joined as defendants and re-
quired to interplead; if a defendant is exposed to similar liability, he
may obtain interpleader by cross-claim or counterclaim. 17 1 In an action
of interpleader where the defendants filed a counterclaim and then
moved to dismiss the complaint, the court had no authority to consider
the counterclaim after such dismissal was granted. 79
X. DiscovERY
A. In General
Rules 1.280 through 1.410 contain the tools of discovery and the
directions for implementing them in building a case. Since these direc-
tions do not always lend themselves to the do-it-yourself approach, the
courts provided numerous interpretations of the directions during the
survey period.
B. Interrogatories and Depositions
Although the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide for dis-
covery methods such as interrogatories and depositions, it has been held
that the rules disclose no intent to abrogate or abolish the traditional
right of a court to entertain pure bills of discovery. 80 The courts have
broad discretion in discovery matters and they may exercise it to
eliminate concealment and surprise so that they can reach the merits of
a cause"' 8-"to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action .... 182
Often, this broad judicial discretion must be exercised to insure
that discovery methods are used properly, as tools rather than as
weapons. For example, in Dade County v. Jordan Marsh Co., 8  the
trial court was held not to have abused its discretion in sustaining a
general objection to mass-produced standard interrogatories without
prejudice to the right of the defendants to file and serve proper inter-
rogatories. Such interrogatories to parties may be limited as justice
177. Oster v. Cay Constr. Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
178. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.240.
179. Acquilina v. Mangus, 223 So.2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
180. Carner v. Ratner, 207 So.2d 310 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Poling v. Petroleum
Carrier Corp., 194 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). See First Nat'l Bank v. Dade-Broward
Co., 125 Fla. 594, 171 So. 510 (1936).
181. See 23 Am. JUR. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 155 (1965).
182. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
183. 219 So.2d 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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requires to protect a party from harassment and oppression. 84 Even
though interrogatories must be answered "separately and fully,"'18 5 if an
interrogatory is framed to call only for a negative or a positive answer,
no additional answer has to be filed when it is answered in the negative.' 86
Rule 1.280 generally provides for depositions pending an action and,
more particularly, for the use of depositions. 87 Rule 1.280(d) provides
for the use of depositions at trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, in addition to their use for pretrial discovery.
When a plaintiff intends to avail himself of the rule relating to deposi-
tions of expert witnesses for use as evidence,'8 8 he must put the defen-
dant on sufficient notice of such intent and apprise defendant of the
fact that he must object prior to the taking of the deposition in order
to enable the court to require the expert witness to attend the trial.'8 9
In Bondy v. West,"° the court held that notice by a personal injury
claimant that he would take the deposition of a particular physician was
insufficient, so that introduction of the deposition was error. A party
intending to introduce a deposition at trial in lieu of a personal appear-
ance by the deposing expert witness must, in order to comply with the
"due notice" and reasonable notice provisions of rule 1.390, specifically
state that the deposition is being taken pursuant to rule 1.390.111
When "the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles
from the place of trial or hearing" 92 use of depositions is permissible.
One plaintiff's attorney established this type of factual situation by long
distance calls at the time of the trial. 93
It has been held that a deposition taken "in aid of execution" is
admissible in a proceeding on a rule nisi, since rule 1.280(d) provides
that depositions may be used at a hearing of a motion or at an inter-
locutory proceeding.94
C. Scope of Discovery
There are few limitations on the matters upon which a deponent
may be examined. The information must be relevant and not privileged;
however, an objection on the ground that the testimony will be inadmis-
sible at trial is not valid, provided that the testimony appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 9
184. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(b).
185. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.340(a).
186. State Rd. Dept. v. Florida E.C. Ry., 212 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
187. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d).
188. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.390.
189. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.390(b).
190. 219 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
191. Id. at 119.
192. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d)(3)(a).
193. See Rosenberg v. Maritime Ins. Co., 212 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
194. See Hanisch v. Wilder, 210 So.2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
195. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
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A privilege may be waived,'96 as in the case where a husband
voluntarily and without objection testified on deposition as to privileged
communications with his wife. 197 However, the court can not require
such a waiver. Thus, when a veterans' hospital had a rule that a doctor
could not discuss a patient's case with a defendant's attorney while
litigation was pending, without the consent of the other side or presence
of the attorneys for both sides, the court could not require plaintiff's
attorney to consent to the defendant's counsel interviewing a doctor who
had invoked this rule.198
In the divorce proceeding in Simkins v. Simkins,'99 the husband
invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The appel-
late court ruled that it was error to require the husband to answer on
deposition questions designed to wring from him, under penalty of dis-
missal of his suit for divorce, an admission of adultery or of facts
relevant to prove adultery, which was punishable as a crime.
In an action by a seller for money owned, the buyer counterclaimed
and filed a motion to produce °2 0  certain telephone recordings that the
president of the seller had made of conversations between himself and
the president of the buyer. The buyer's motion was denied. On certiorari,
it was held that since key issues might turn on agreements made during
the conversations, the recordings would be relevant to the subject matter
of the actions or might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and,
therefore, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny the
buyer's motion to produce.20 '
An action was brought for specific performance, injunctive relief,
and an accounting. The issue of the right to an accounting had not yet
been decided when the plaintiff sought production of certain documents,
records, and papers. The court held that the order to produce was
improper to the extent that it required production of documents solely
relevant to the accounting before the issue of a right to an accounting
was decided.20 2
In Ford Motor Co. v. Cochran,°8 an action was brought against
the manufacturer of a bearing by an automobile mechanic injured when
the bearing shattered. The fourth district held, inter alia, that the manu-
facturer was not entitled to take the deposition of experts who had made
tests on behalf of the mechanic, since this same court had previously
196. Savino v. Luciano, 92 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1957).
197. Tibado v. Brees, 212 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); see FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.330(c)(a). But cf. Jones v. Life Ins. Co., 215 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
198. Devlin v. Rosman, 205 So.2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
199. 219 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). But cf. Markey v. Joe Sam Lee, 224 So.2d
789 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
200. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
201. Southern Mill Creek Prods. v. Delta Chem. Co., 203 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1967).
202. Armstrong v. Piatt, 201 So.2d 830 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
203. 205 So.2d 55 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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recognized that an expert witness is not subject to discovery with regard
to expert testimony. °4
D. Refusal to Make Discovery
Rule 1.380 provides sanctions in the discretion of the court when a
party or other deponent refuses to answer 0 5 or fails to comply with a
discovery order.2 6 When a plaintiff elects not to comply with an order
to produce which is not erroneous, the trial judge may correctly dismiss
the case as to the defendant.0 7
The judicial thinking in this area is elucidated in the case of
Hurley v. Werly.208 The court held that a Roman Catholic bishop had
the protective attributes of a "corporate sole." In deference to his
privileged legal status, before visiting upon him the drastic penalty of
outright default for failure to appear to have his deposition taken,209 the
court should have adopted other expedients such as requiring the defen-
dant to procure whatever information he sought to obtain from the
bishop by deposition from other available sources.210
XI. DIsMIssAL
A. Voluntary
Generally, a party may have his action voluntarily dismissed without
a court order by a notice of dismissal served on the opposing party or
stated on the trial record, or by a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties.21 Voluntary dismissal by order of the court is also available,
upon motion and with notice to all other parties.212
Dismissal by notice of dismissal may be accomplished "at any time
before a hearing on motion for summary judgment, or ... before retire-
ment of the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a
nonjury case to the court .... '82 Thus, when the court, at the close
204. Hartstone Concrete Prods. Co. v. Ivancevich, 200 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
205. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a).
206. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b).
207. Kennedy & Cohen, Inc. v. Allen Appliance Serv., Inc., 214 So.2d 488 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1968). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(iii).
208. 203 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
This is known as the "sanction" portion of the discovery Rules. It is not penal.
It is not punitive. It is not aimed at punishment of the litigant. The objective
is compliance-compliance with the discovery Rules. The sanctions are set up as
a means to an end, not the end itself. The end is compliance. The sanctions should
be invoked only in flagrant cases, certainly in no less than aggravated cases, and
then only after the Court has given the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity
to conform after originally failing or even refusing to appear. This is unmistakenly
the trend of judicial thinking in Florida on the "sanction" Rule.
Id. at 537.
209. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d).
210. Hurley v. Werly, 203 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
211. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1).
212. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(2).
213. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1).
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of final arguments, granted counsel leave to submit briefs substantiating
their respective positions by a designated date and the case had not
been submitted to the court for decision, the plaintiff who filed notice
of dismissal before the date for submission of briefs had an absolute
right to dismiss his case. 214 Notice of dismissal was still timely after the
trial court had indicated its intention to grant defendant's motion for
a directed verdict215 at the close of the plaintiff's evidence but prior to
any announcement to that effect by the court to the jury.216
In an action to determine ownership of land, the trial judge dis-
missed the case with leave to amend. The plaintiffs, instead of filing an
amended complaint within the time allotted, filed a voluntary dismissal,
and the judge dismissed the case with prejudice.2 17 The supreme court,
reversing the appellate court and the trial judge, held that the dismissal
of the complaint with leave to amend was interlocutory in nature and
did not cut off plaintiff's right to file a voluntary dismissal.21
B. Involuntary
While a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice unless other-
wise specified, an involuntary dismissal under rule 1.420(b) generally
operates as an adjudication on the merits, i.e., with prejudice. 9
Rule 1.420(b) now requires notice of hearing on a motion for involun-
tary dismissal in order to conform with rule 1.090(d) .22° The motion to
dismiss most frequently encountered is the one based upon the ground
that the party seeking relief has not shown that he is entitled to it,
221
and this motion may be made after the party seeking relief has com-
pleted the presentation of his evidence.222
C. Failure to Prosecute
Before rule 1.420(e) was amended,223 petitions for reinstatement of
a cause dismissed for failure to prosecute could be filed within one month
after such dismissal, 2 4 the one-month period running from the date of
the recording of the orders of dismissal.225 The only question to be de-
cided upon motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is a factual
one-whether there was any affirmative action taken during the one-
year period specified by the rule. Examples of action held sufficient to
214. Dreher v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 220 So.2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
215. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480; see p. 560 infra.
216. Meyer v. Contemporary Broadcasting Co., 207 So.2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
217. Hibbard v. State Rd. Dept., 216 So.2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
218. State Rd. Dept. v. Hibbard, 225 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1969).
219. Exceptions to the general rule are dismissals "for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party . . . ." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
220. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 211 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1968).
221. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6).
222. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
223. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 211 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1968).
224. FLA. STAT. § 45.19(1) (1965).
225. Larybar, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 208 So.2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
preclude dismissal under 1.420(e) include the following: filing of an
amended complaint; requesting admissions and setting down for hearing
the defendant's motion to dismiss; 6 issuing a witness subpoena and a
subpoena duces tecum; giving notice of deposition in order to ascertain
the defendant's address for service of process; 227 filing of additional
interrogatories; 218 giving notice of hearing on pending motions; 2 9 and
filing a trial notice.230 Whether there was "good cause" why the action
should remain pending was taken into consideration only on petition for
reinstatement after a dismissal for lack of prosecution.2 3'
The amended rule, 1.420(e), provided for dismissal "after reason-
able notice to the parties, unless a party shows good cause in writing
why the action should remain pending at least five days before the
hearing on the motion.' 232 Though decided subsequent to the recent
amendment of rule 1.420(e), Sroczyk v. Fritz2 3 made no mention of the
amendment. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, held that "on
the hearing of a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under
Rule 1.420(e) the plaintiff may show good cause . . .why the motion
should not be granted, and if such showing is made the case should not
be dismissed. ' 2
3 4
The effect of the rule change was specifically considered in State
ex rel. Avery v. Williams.235 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute under the amended rule 1.420(e), serving a notice
of hearing on said motion. Twenty-eight days elapsed between the
original filing of the motion and the date of hearing. Since the plaintiff
failed to file any response showing good cause "why the action should
remain pending at least five days before the hearing, ' 21 6 the court held
that the defendant was entitled to have the action dismissed and to a
writ prohibiting the trial court from granting plaintiff's motion to rein-
state the action on alleged grounds of good cause, made after the
motion to dismiss was granted. 3 7 This case clearly established the effect
of the rule change in eliminating the necessity of two hearings by allow-
ing the trial court to consider at one hearing the questions: 1) whether
the action taken during the one-year period was sufficient to preclude
226. Popkin v. Crispen, 213 So.2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
227. Reddish v. Forlines, 207 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
228. City of Jacksonville v. Hinson, 202 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), cert. denied,
207 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1968).
229. Knowles v. Gilbert, 208 So.2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
230. Biegel v. Simon, 210 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
231. See Laug v. Murphy, 205 So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
232. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) (emphasis added).
233. 220 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1969), rev'g Fritz v. Sroczyk, 202 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1967).
234. Sroczyk v. Fritz, 220 So.2d 908, 912 (Fla. 1969).
235. 222 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
236. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
237. State ex rel. Avery v. Williams, 222 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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dismissal for failure to prosecute; and 2) whether there is ."good cause"
for the action to remain pending.
XII. TRIALS
A. Right to Trial by Jury
"The right of trial by jury declared by the Constitution or by
statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."2 ' Although the 1967
revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure resulted in the procedural
merger of law and equity, " it did not abolish law or equity, and "sub-
stantive law should be applied to the actual allegations and relief sought
in a complaint or petition .... "240 The question of whether a jury
should try the facts of a case is still to be decided by the tests existing
under the Florida Constitution or by legislative enactment. Thus, in a
suit to abate a continuing trespass to real property and for compensatory
damages, the portion of the court order submitting the issue of compen-
satory damages, if any, to the jury as incident to appropriate equitable
relief was proper, 4' 1 but submitting the issue of punitive damages, if
any, to the jury was improper since punitive damages must be authorized
by statute,' 4 ' and no such authorization was shown.248
Demand for jury trial of an issue may be made by service on the
other party not more than ten days after the service of the last pleading
directed to that issue, or it may be endorsed on a pleading. 44 Failure to
make a timely demand results in waiver. 45
B. Consolidation and Separate Trials
When there are common questions of law or fact involved, the court
may order joint hearings or trials, consolidation of actions, or whatever
is reasonable in avoiding unnecessary costs or delay.24 6 The court may
also order separate trials of claims on the same issues "in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice .... Discretion is broad in this
area since these actions by the court are clearly in the interest of
securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.' 248 Thus, it was held that the trial court's decision to sever the
issue of liability from the issue of damages by submitting the question
of foreseeability of damages to the jury and deciding the amount of
238. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(a).
239. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.040.
240. R.C. #17 Corp. v. Korenblit, 207 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
241. The general rule in Florida has been that equity can award damages incident to
restraining a trespass. Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1896).
242. See Orkin Exterm. Co. v. Truley Nolen, Inc., 117 So.2d 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
243. R.C. #17 Corp. v. Korenblit, 207 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
244. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(b).
245. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).
246. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(a).
247. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
248. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
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damages itself after the jury decided the question in the plaintiff's favor
was not improper.249
C. Continuances
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the statute250 providing
for continuances of causes in which a legislator is involved for the term
of the legislature is unconstitutional in its application to litigation involv-
ing emergency relief and irreparable damage, and the court should exer-
cise judicial discretion in determining whether a continuance should be
granted.25 The rule governing motions for continuances provided that
they "may be made only before or at the time the case is set for trial,
unless good cause for failure to do so is shown or unless the ground for
the motion arose after the action was set for trial. 252 Such a motion
must state the facts entitling the movant to a continuance and, if he
seeks a continuance "on the ground of non-availability of a witness, the
motion must show when it is believed the witness will be available."25
An order setting an unlawful detainer action for trial did not state
that the trial would be by jury. The defendant's counsel came from
another community and stated that he had not anticipated a jury trial
and had therefore not hired local counsel, which he would have done had
he known the trial would be to a jury. Under these facts, the appellate
court ruled that the ordering of a jury trial and refusal to grant de-
fendant's motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion.254 However,
it was held not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance when the
defendants already had one postponement, the case had been pending
for more than two years, and the absent codefendant's testimony could
have been taken by deposition. 255
XIII. DIRECTED VERDICT
A. In General
Since verdicts must have a rational predicate in the evidence and
cannot rest on a mere probability or guess, a trial court is under an
affirmative duty to direct a verdict in cases where the evidence, con-
sidered as a whole, fails to prove the plaintiff's case under the issues set
forth.
25
Plaintiff petitioned, by writ of certiorari, for review of an order by
the district court of appeal directing the trial court to sustain "defen-
249. F. & B. Ceco, Inc. v. Galaxy Studios, Inc., 216 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
250. FLA. STAT. § 11.111 (1967).
251. A.B.C. Business Forms, Inc. v. Spaet, 201 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1967).
252. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460(a). The rule governing setting of cases for trial has been
revised. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.440.
253. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460(b).
254. Pittman v. Haselwood, 214 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
255. Lydick v. Chance, 214 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
256. Conda v. Plain, 215 So.2d 13, 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
dant's motion for directed verdict non obstante veredicto, in lieu of the
order entered by the lower court granting [defendant's alternative]
motion for new trial." '257 The district court of appeal had directed a
ruling on that motion on its own initiative and it was neither presented
nor briefed in that court.258 The supreme court held that the direction
was error but approved that portion of the judgment of the district court
which affirmed the granting of defendant's motion for new trial.259
When the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the
plaintiff without allowing the defendant an opportunity to present evi-
dence in his behalf and the court on appeal was "unable to say as a
matter of law that there could be no evidence whatsoever adduced which
could support a verdict for defendant," 2" the defendant had to be
given his day in court.261
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the testimony in a jury trial were not within the province of the trial
court, being exclusively a jury function.262 When such questions were
present, the court erred in passing upon a motion for directed verdict
or judgment in accordance therewith.63
In a third district case, the defendant-appellee had moved for a
directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, and made a motion
which he labelled "Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict" within ten
days of the rendition of a verdict for the plaintiff. The motion should
have been labelled a "motion for judgment in accordance with motion
for directed verdict," since there is no mention in the applicable provi-
sion of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for a motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto. 214 The appellate court held that "granting relief
in accordance with the substance of appellee's motion rather than deny-
ing the appellee relief because the motion was improperly titled . . .265
was not reversible error when the substance of the motion complied with
the requirements of the rule and the appellant was neither prejudiced nor
misled by the erroneous title of the motion as presented by the defen-
dant.266
Under directed verdict procedure, the trial court must consider the
testimony presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus,
when there was credible evidence which would warrant a finding that
defendant's employees did not use reasonable care under the circum-
257. Gifford v. Galaxie Homes of Tampa, Inc., 204 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1967).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Bittson v. Steinman, 210 So.2d 30, 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
261. id.
262. McQueen v. Atlantic Truck Serv., Inc., 215 So.2d 325, 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
263. Id.
264. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
265. De Mendoza v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 221 So.2d 797, 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
266. Id.
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stances, the issue of defendant's negligence should have been submitted
to the jury.2 6
B. Reservation of Decision on Motion
"[T]he validity of a judgment non obstante veredicto should be
tested by the rules applicable to motions for directed verdicts."268 As
stated in terms of present Florida procedural practice, 2 9 when a ruling
has been reserved and the court has for consideration a defendant's
motion after the verdict for a judgment based on defendant's motion
for directed verdict, the court should not rule in favor of the defendant
"unless it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that could
in law support a verdict for plaintiff. . . .This is so because under the
present practice, provided for by rule 1.480 RCP, the ruling made is a
deferred ruling on the motion for directed verdict.
'270
XIV. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
When the defendant mailed a motion to dismiss on the date that the
response to the complaint was due, it was error for the court to enter a
default against him2 71 because "[a] party may plead or otherwise
defend at any time before default is entered.
'27 2
The trial court was held to have abused its discretion in refusing to
set aside a default judgment entered in an action for garnishment against
the garnishee when the latter's default, consisting of his failure to file
an answer to the writ of garnishment, was due to inadvertent and excus-
able neglect. 273
The established rule in Florida is that in case of reasonable
doubt, where there has been no trial upon the merits, the dis-
cretion of the trial court is usually exercised in favor of grant-
ing the procedure so as to permit a determination upon the
merits. [citation omitted] A motion to set aside a default
judgment against a garnishee for failure to file an answer to
the writ of garnishment may be made in response to the writ
of scire facias and should be granted, where the default was
due to excusable neglect. [citations omitted]2 74
A motion to make the complaint more definite and certain was
267. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Big Chief Constr. Co., 211 So.2d 21 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1968).
268. Conda v. Plain, 215 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) (citations omitted). The
court was obviously not using the modern label for the motion for judgment based on de-
fendant's motion for directed verdict.
269. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
270. Whitman v. Red Top Sedan Serv., Inc., 218 So.2d 213, 215 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
271. Lake Towers, Inc. v. Axelrod, 216 So.2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
272. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(c).
273. F.W. Dodge Co. Div. of McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Southern Indus. Say. Bank, 207
So.2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
274. Id. at 518.
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granted and the defendant was ordered to file her answer within ten
days after service of the amended complaint, but she filed a motion to
dismiss within that period instead. Subsequent to the end of the 10-day
period, the plaintiff filed an amended motion for entry of a default
judgment based on the defendant's noncompliance with the order regard-
ing filing of an answer. Two days prior to the granting of the motion for
default, the defendant filed the requested responsive pleading. On appeal
by the defendant from the order granting the default, the court held
that a pleading had been filed (defendant's motion to dismiss) and that
refusal to set aside the default constituted an abuse of discre-
tion and amounted to "punishment" for possible misconduct
on the part of the defendant's counsel. If that be the case, it
would seem to be unfair to penalize the litigant for the conduct
of her counsel.2 7 5
XV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The party moving for a summary final decree must affirmatively
show an absence of a genuine issue of any material fact and that he is
entitled to such a decree in his favor under the applicable substantive
law.
276
Plaintiff must, of course, prove the elements of . . . [the]
cause of action, but ... need not do so until trial. To require
... [the plaintiff] to prove ... [his] case in order to success-
fully oppose a motion for summary judgment imposes a burden
upon plaintiff that is neither contemplated nor justified under
the cases and rules of procedure. 77
The movant's concession in a motion for summary judgment as to
the nonexistence of any genuine issue as to a material fact is only for
the purpose of his motion and is not to be extended as a benefit or
advantage to be used by the nonmoving party against the movant.78
"In an intersection accident even though the party moving for
summary judgment had the right-of-way, he is not automatically entitled
to a summary judgment.' 27' The responsibility to use reasonable care
exists even when a driver had the right-of-way and whether the movant
fulfilled that responsibility was a question for the jury to determine. °
A party moving for summary judgment may not substitute an affi-
davit upon the motion for a complaint.28 '
275. Sharpe v. Herman A. Thomas, Inc., 206 So.2d 655, 656-57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
276. McClendon v. Key, 209 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th.Dist. 1968).
277. Lampman v. City of N. Miami, 209 So.2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
278. McClendon v. Key, 209 So.2d 273, 276- (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
279. Cohen v. Dennis, 209 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
280. Id.
281. Turf Express, Inc. v. Palmer, 209 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). See FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), dealing with requisites for granting of a motion for summary judgment.
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Indeed, the very language of Rule 1.510(c) . . . seems to
provide for a summary judgment only when the claim is sup-
ported by 'the pleadings.' A trial court may not grant a summary
judgment upon an issue raised by an affidavit in support of
the motion rather than by a complaint.... [A] contrary hold-
ing would deprive the party defending against the motion ...
of an opportunity to raise defenses to the claim.2" 2
Relaxation of the rule would result in trial by affidavit. Rule 1.190(b),
which allowed issues tried by express or implied consent of the parties
but not raised by the pleadings to be treated as if they had been raised
in the pleadings, was limited to the resolution of the issues at full trial
and was not extended to summary proceedings.2 1
3
Affidavits served by rfiail in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must be mailed three days before the hearing in order to be
considered." 4
At a hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff unsuccessfully made an oral motion either to amend the defec-
tive affidavit of an expert which she had submitted in opposition to the
motion or to supplement it by a deposition of the affiant. The supreme
court held that when the deficiencies contained in the affidavit were
largely technical28 5 and may have been amenable to correction, the
plaintiff
should have been afforded, pursuant to her oral motion, at
least one opportunity to amend or supplement the affidavit.
Liberal treatment is the rule-and should not be the excep-
tion-under these circumstances, particularly where the peti-
tioner is not given the benefit of the reasons for the rejection
of the affidavit in the trial court's order and an appeal thereon
could not be predicated with certainty nor any opportunity to
correct deficiencies in the affidavit.
Great caution should be exercised in any summary judg-
ment proceedings not to deny a litigant ample opportunity to
demonstrate that he is entitled to the benefit of a trial.2 86
The court believed that if the plaintiff's oral motion had been granted
the affiant might have been able to correct the deficiencies contained in
the affidavit and the suit would not have been dismissed without a trial.
Accordingly, the supreme court quashed the judgment of the district
282. Id. at 462.
283. Id.
284. Henry Stiles, Inc. v. Evans, 206 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). See FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.090(e) (1967).
285. The deficiencies as pointed out by the district court of appeal consisted of "failure
to show affirmatively that affiant was competent to express the opinion contained therein
and the vagueness of the affidavit .... " Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 216 So.2d 448, 450
(Fla. 1968).
. 286. Id.
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court of appeal which had affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
for the defendant. 28 7
The language of rule 1.510(e), formerly rule 1.36(e), clearly indi-
cates that supporting and opposing affidavits on a motion for summary
judgment must be made "on personal knowledge" of the affiant as to
"such facts as would be admissible in evidence" in order to be of any
efficacy. Thus, where an affidavit in support of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment stated no evidential facts, but only conclusions of
ultimate facts or hearsay evidence not meeting any of the exceptions
"such affidavit fails to meet the requirement of the rule that the affi-
davit 'shall show affirmatively that affiant is competent to testify' to
such matters.1 288
The rule of Williams v. Duggan2 9 that a party may not, after
giving deposition or affidavit, subsequently change his testimony to
create an issue upon his opponent's motion for summary judgment was
held not to extend to a situation in which a witness had signed one
affidavit and then later signed another affidavit which stated facts to the
contrary.290 The court held that "a witness is not irrevocably bound by
his first written statement upon the issues of a case. ' 291
Where a plaintiff's affidavits do not contradict affirmative
defenses raised by the opponent of the motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff is not entitled to a summary judgment
even though his supporting affidavits may have made out a
sufficient case based on the pleadings alone.292
Thus, in an action for foreclosure of a chattel mortgage on an automo-
bile where an affidavit of the defendant's attorney raised an issue of
fact as to the affirmative defense of payment and the plaintiff's affi-
davits did not eliminate the defenses set forth by the defendant, it was
error to grant a summary judgment for the plaintiff. 298
Summary judgments must be constructed on a granite
foundation of uncontradicted material facts. It is well settled
that summary judgments and decrees should be entered with
caution. Even where the evidence is uncontradicted, the trial
court lacks the authority to enter a summary judgment or de-
cree if such evidence is reasonably susceptible of conflicting
inferences.294
287. Id.
288. Greer v. Workman, 203 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
289. 172 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
290. Andrews v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
291. Id.
292. Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank & Trust Co., 208 So.2d 152, 153
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) (citations omitted).
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. Meigs v. Lear, 210 So.2d 479, 480 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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Additionally, "the foreseeable difficulty of proving certain allega-
tions may not be used as a yardstick for granting or denying a motion
for a summary judgment . *. . ."" Consequently, in an action for
inverse condemnation where the evidence before the court was "reason-
ably susceptible" of an inference that the defendants had taken the
plaintiffs' property, the issue should have been determined by a jury
and should not have been disposed of by summary judgment.296
The standards upon which a motion for new trial and a motion for
summary judgment rest are clearly distinguishable, 297 so that proper
affirmance of an order granting a motion for a new trial "is no basis for
also granting that party's motion for summary judgment."2 9 Rule 1.5 10
requires a showing by the movant that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, while, on the other hand, a motion for new trial may rise or fall
on the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the scope of the trial
judge's authority to grant a motion for summary judgment is not limited
to circumstances where there is no evidence to support the plaintiff's
case.
299
XVI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND REHEARING
A. New Trial
In making a study of the record in the trial court to determine
whether an order of the trial judge granting a new trial should be
upset, the first district stated in Hendricks v. Daily:
[I]t is not sufficient for the reviewing court merely to detect
the presence of 'competent, substantial evidence at the trial to
support the jury's verdict.' One attacking such an order has a
heavy burden to make error to appear in the exercise of the
broad discretion allowed the judge who has presided at the
trial, and who has had direct, personal contact with the presen-
tation of the case as it unfolded at the trial level."'0
However, the same court in a different decision in that case stated:
[a]n observation by a trial judge that the verdict is contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence does not make such a
finding an absolute fact; it must be found from a basis in the
record. An appellate court does not review a trial judge's con-
science. If the record does not support the finding, it neces-
295. Wilson v. State Rd. Dept., 201 So.2d 619, 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
296. Id. at 624.
297. Glisson v. North Florida Tel. Co., 210 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
298. Id. at 27.
299. Id.
300. 208 So.2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1968). See note 301 infra for a history of this case. See
also Spearman Distrib. Co. V. Boyette, 205 So.2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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sarily follows that an abuse of discretion is indicated on the
part of the trial judge.310
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial when it appeared from the record that the
procedural irregularity on which the defendant based his motion occurred
during the final argument of the defendant's counsel before the jury
retired and counsel realized the error before the jury returned to
deliver its verdict, but he did not complain until after announcement
of the adverse verdict. °2
In an action including a counterclaim, it was error for the trial
judge to grant a motion for a new trial on the ground that claims
should have been severed for trial purposes, when neither counsel re-
quested that any issue be severed and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the counterclaimant."°3
While Rule 1.270(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
30 F.S.A., gives the court the discretion to order the separate
trial of any claim, nevertheless . . . the piecemeal trial of
actions is not considered a matter of right, and is allowed only
when it would further justice and avoid undue expense or in-
convenience to the parties. 04
On appeal of a denial by the trial judge of a motion for new trial,
where one of the grounds for the motion was that the jurors had arrived
at a "quotient verdict," the decision was affirmed.
In order to overturn a verdict on this ground, it is necessary
to establish by clear and convincing proof that a verdict was
in fact arrived at in such fashion as to be a quotient verdict.
[citations omitted] The courts of this State have been reluc-
tant to reverse a trial judge when he had granted [or denied]
a new trial on this ground .... .-o5
301. Dailey v. Hendricks, 213 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). This case has been the
subject of at least four appellate decisions. The First District Court of Appeal, at 200 So.2d
566 (1967), reversed a judgment for the defendants notwithstanding a verdict for plain-
tiffs, and the defendants then brought certiorari. The Supreme Court of Florida, at 208
So.2d 101, held that the district court of appeal had properly reversed the order granting
the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiffs, but
that it had improperly applied the same standards to the defendant's motion for new trial.
The order of the district court awarding a new trial was quashed and the cause remanded
to the district court for reconsideration. On remand, at 211 So.2d 222, the order granting
a new trial to the defendants was affirmed. On petition for rehearing by the district court,
213 So.2d 600 (1968), the judgment appealed from was reversed and the cause remanded
with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Rehearing was denied by the First District Court of Appeal on Sept. 12, 1968.
302. Omer Corp. v. Duke, 211 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
303. Manes v. Rowley, 218 So.2d 487 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
304. Id. at 489.
305. Pix Shoes, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). See Note, 22
UNIv. oF MlAmi L. REv. 729 (1967).
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The court believed that when only one juror testified at the hearing on
the motion that the jurors had used a quotient verdict method, notwith-
standing a signed statement by three jurors and the jury foreman to
the same effect, overruling the new trial motion did not constitute an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.306
When the record established that an order denying a motion for a
new trial was not based upon the merits but was brought about by the
mistake or excusable neglect of counsel, the court had jurisdiction under
rule 1.540(b) "to entertain and rule on such motion or petition for
rehearing."' °7 Therefore, when the trial judge who heard the motion for
a new trial originally announced his intention to grant it but subse-
quently denied the motion because the parties failed to provide him
with a transcript of the trial proceedings as he had requested, he could
thereafter entertain and rule on the motion when a transcript was sub-
sequently furnished. 80 8
Rule 1.530(b) provides that "[a] motion for new trial or for re-
hearing shall be served not later than 10 days after the rendition of
verdict . . . or the entry of judgment ... ." Therefore, a new trial motion
which was served on the defendant 13 days after rendition of the
verdict was untimely and properly stricken.30 9 "The court cannot hear
and pass on a reason for a new trial which is not filed within the time
specified. It should be treated as nothing more than what it actually
is-an untimely motion subject to be stricken or denied." 10
An amended or successive motion for a new trial filed later than
10 days after the judgment was not untimely when it had been preceded
by a timely motion for a new trial which had not yet been ruled upon
by the trial court. 1' Over one month after the filing of the amended
motion, it was granted by the trial court; however, since the order
failed to specify the grounds upon which it was based, it was fatally
defective. 12 Appellants raised this defect in a motion for rehearing of
the defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial court responded by
entering an amended order in an attempt to cure the defect by stating
the ground upon which their earlier order was based. The trial court's
order granting a new trial was reversed in spite of its corrective action
and the jury's verdict was reinstated by the First District Court of
306. Id.
307. De Padro v. Moore, 215 So.2d 27, 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
308. Id.
309. Potetti v. Ben Lil, Inc., 213 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). See also Bescar En-
terprises, Inc. v. Rotenberger, 221 So.2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), holding that a motion
for a new trial filed 14 days after rendition of the verdict was untimely and subject to be
stricken or denied.
310. Bescar Enterprises, Inc. v. Rotenberger, 221 So.2d 801, 802 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.090(b).
311. Adkins v. Burdeshaw, 220 So.2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
312. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appeal. The court held, pursuant to the 1965 decision of the Florida
Supreme Court in Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc.,'8" "that an order
granting a new trial ...which was defective because of the failure to
state the grounds on which the motion was granted could not be cor-
rected after ten days." '314 The attempted corrective action was rendered
fruitless as it occurred some 6 weeks after the defective order was
entered and then the lower court was without jurisdiction to correct
the order granting a new trial.815
B. Adequacy of Verdict
"A verdict for grossly inadequate damages stands on the same
ground as a verdict for excessive damages, a new trial may be as readily
granted in one case as the other."8 A verdict awarding the plaintiff's
father the full amount of medical expenses incurred for uncontrovertedly
painful surgical procedures performed on the plaintiff, who was awarded
zero dollars for his pain and suffering, was held so inconsistent as to
require a new trial on the issue of the minor's damages alone."'
In a suit for damages for negligent treatment resulting in the
death of a dog and for the wrongful disposal of the dog's body, where
the only evidence of the dog's value was that it was worth $100 when
alive, it was held that a verdict of $1,000 was excessive and against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the jury having decided against allow-
ance of any punitive damages.3 1 The trial court did not err, therefore,
in ordering remittitur to reduce the verdict with the alternative of a new
trial on damages.319
The trial judge's authority to grant a new trial is not "controlled
solely by the presence in the record of substantial, competent evidence
to support the verdict. The trial judge's authority in the premises,
although reviewable, is nonetheless within his broad discretion."820 The
First District Court of Appeal held that it was not an abuse of this
discretion to grant a new trial for the stated reason that the verdict was
so inadequate that it shocked the judicial conscience of the court when
the court specifically found that the jury failed to heed the instructions
of the court on the issues of liability and damages, and there was unre-
futed evidence of permanent injuries to the plaintiff.8 2'
313. 182 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
314. Adkins v. Burdesbaw, 220 So.2d 39, 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
315. Id.
316. Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So.2d 730, 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) (citations omitted).
317. Id.
318. Levine v. Knowles, 218 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
319. Id.
320. Spearman Distrib. Co. v. Boyette, 205 So.2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) (cita-
tion omitted).
321. Id.
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C. Rehearing
Rule 1.530(b) provides that motions for rehearing shall be served
within 10 days after the judgment is rendered. When such motions are
raised sua sponte, the rule 22 requires that the court enter its order
for rehearing "[n]ot later than ten days after entry of judgment or
within the time of ruling on a timely motion for a rehearing or a new
trial made by a party .... "I Thus, it was error for the trial court to
amend and clarify its order as requested in the motion for clarification,
which was filed 32 days after entry of the original order since the
motion was the equivalent of a motion for rehearing, subject to the time
limitations set out in rule 1.530.24
Transmission by mail of the appellate court's opinion to appellant's
counsel was not considered a ground for extending the time allowed to
apply for rehearing by 3 days. 25 The appellant's petition having been
applied for more than 15 days after filing of the decision was correctly
struck as untimely. 26
Within 10 days of the entry of an order dismissing his second
amended complaint with prejudice, the appellant filed a motion for re-
hearing. The motion was denied, and entry of the order thereon was
made several months later. Appellant filed a notice of appeal within 30
days after the denial of his motion for rehearing, and the court, in de-
nying the defendant's motion to dismiss, held that the earlier motion
for rehearing was proper and had tolled the time for appeal. 27 It was
proper under rule 1.530 to move to rehear an order dismissing a com-
plaint with prejudice
because it is directed to an otherwise appealable final judgment
heard without a jury within the terms of the rule. This being
a judgment, a motion filed within ten (10) days of its entry is
proper and tolls the time for appeal. This was the procedure
under the former equity rules, and is therefore encompassed
by Rule 1.530 of our modern rules of procedure in which law
and equity have been merged."'
XVII. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, DECREES, OR ORDERS
A. In General
Rule 1.540(b)(1) which would allow the court to relieve a party
from a final decree for mistake, envisioned "the type of honest and in-
advertent mistake made in the ordinary course of litigation, usually by
322. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(d).
323. Id.
324. Kirby v. Speight, 217 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
325. In re Rogers, 205 So.2d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
326. Id.
327. Snyder v. Gulf Am. Corp., 224 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
328. Id. at 406 (citation omitted).
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the Court itself, and is generally for the purpose of 'setting the record
straight.' "329 A "miscalculated reliance" by the wife upon her husband's
representations inducing her to consent to a voluntary dismissal of di-
vorce proceedings was not considered to be the type of mistake contem-
plated by the rule.3'0 The court nonetheless affirmed the Chancellor's
order setting aside the dismissal, holding that since the order appealed
had not become final, it was "still under the 'inherent control' of the
Court to prevent injustice." '
Rule 1.540 also permits relief from a final judgment, decree, or or-
der on the basis of "newly discovered evidence."8 2 "Forgotten evidence
newly remembered" would not support an order granting relief pursuant
to this provision because the rule contemplates such evidence as "could
not have been timely discovered by due diligence." ''
A third basis for relief under rule 1.540 is "excusable neglect."
"Errors and omissions of counsel in the conduct of pending litigation
may be 'excusable' when considered in the light of generally accepted
practices and amenities with which he is familiar, and upon which he
may have had a right to rely. "3 4 When the record is silent as to the
prevailing practice and procedure relied upon by attorneys in the appli-
cable judicial circuit, the question of whether counsel's neglect was "ex-
cusable" as envisioned under rule 1.540 "is more properly addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. '3 13 5
A party seeking "relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540(b),
F.R.C.P., by reason of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable ne-
glect on the part of counsel, [must] . . .show that the facts and cir-
cumstances justifying said relief to be applicable to all counsel for said
party who have appeared in the case." ' 6 The appellant who failed to
establish, by either pleading, affidavit, or other proof, the reason for his
cocounsel's failure to file a required amendment of his complaint within
the time allowed was denied relief from the judgment of dismissal be-
cause the evidence presented on his motion was insufficient under rule
1.540(b) .3 3 7
In order to preserve the right to appellate review of the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant "must make either a timely
motion for directed verdict, or a motion for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the manifest weight of the
329. Danner v. Danner, 206 So.2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540.
333. Kash 'N Karry Wholesale Supermarkets, Inc. v. Garcia, 221 So.2d 786, 788 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1969).
334. Id. at 789 (footnote omitted).
335. Id.
336. Rogers v. First Nat Bank, 223 So.2d 365, 367 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (emphasis
supplied).
337. Id.
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evidence, and properly assign as error the denial of such motion .... ""'
In order to question the existence of a valid satisfaction of a prior
judgment, satisfaction having been entered on the final judgment, relief
should be sought under rule 1.540, and not by collateral attack in a
separate action. "If the entry of satisfaction was for any reason im-
proper plaintiffs should have sought amendment or vacation. 339
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order taxing costs,
holding that payment and satisfaction of a judgment precluded the sub-
sequent entry of an order taxing costs.840
In City of Hallandale v. Chatlos,84' the appellant, a municipal cor-
poration, had taken an interlocutory and plenary appeal to the fourth
district from a cost judgment entered after a voluntary dismissal in a
condemnation proceeding. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeals
contending a cost judgment was reviewable only by petition under Flor-
ida Appellate Rule 3.16(c), which provides that
[i]f any party shall feel aggrieved by any judgment for costs,
said judgment shall be reviewable in the appellate court upon
petition, provided the petition is filed within 20 days after the
entry of said judgment.
Although the third district had rendered several decisions in accordance
with appellee's contention, the fourth district chose the view espoused
by the second district in Craft v. Clarembeaux42 "that the proper
method of securing review of a cost judgment entered following a vol-
untary dismissal of a cause of action is by writ of certiorari. 34 8 Thus,
the fourth district dismissed the interlocutory appeal pursuant to Flor-
ida Statutes section 59.45, and treated the plenary appeal as a petition
for a writ of certiorari. The statute provides that in appeals improvi-
dently taken, "where the remedy might have been more properly sought
by certiorari, this alone shall not be a ground for dismissal; but the no-
tice of appeal and the record thereon shall be regarded and acted on as
a petition for certiorari duly presented to the Supreme Court." '844 On
conflict certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, the decision of the
fourth district denying the motion to dismiss the plenary appeal was
approved, and the Craft case was held to be correct. 45 All contrary de-
cisions were declared overruled.84 The court specifically refrained from
338. Winnemore v. Morton, 214 So.2d 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) (citations omitted).
339. Weaver v. Stone, 212 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
340. Dock & Marine Constr. Corp. v. Parrino, 211 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
341. 220 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1968).
342. 162 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
343. City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 211 So.2d 53, 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), rev'd, Chat-
los v. City of Hallandale, 220 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1968).
344. Id.
345. Chatlos v. City of Hallandale, 220 So.2d 353, 354 (Fla. 1968).
346. Id. at 354 n.4.
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passing on the question of whether the interlocutory appeal had been
properly dismissed . 4 7
Liberality should be applied in setting aside, upon motion, a decree
pro confesso before it becomes absolute, but such an order should not
be disturbed on appeal after the final decree unless there is a showing
of gross abuse of discretion. 48 No abuse existed when the trial court
set aside a decree pro confesso prior to the entry of a final decree for
the failure of the defendant to plead within the time required and al-
lowed him to file an answer.8 49
B. Interlocutory Appeals
Notwithstanding the fact that the distinction between actions at
law and in equity has been abolished, Florida Appellate Rule 4.2(a)
provides that interlocutory orders in actions at law may be appealed
only when such interlocutory orders relate to venue or jurisdiction
over the person. Thus, an order dismissing a count based on usury,
which sounds in law, "falls outside the class of interlocutory orders
which may be reviewable ... in conformance with Florida Appellate
Rule 4.2, subd. a." '
Interlocutory appeals from orders granting partial summary judg-
ment on liability in civil cases may only be allowed when the orders
completely disposed of all issues of liability. 5'
Judgments determining the right to an accounting are interlocutory
orders, and a trial court has jurisdiction to amend or modify such orders
at any time prior to the entry of final judgment. 52 Accordingly, a plain-
tiff is entitled to proceed with two admittedly proper accountings while
contesting a ruling on the third, when the three accountings relate to
separate transactions in different named and numbered accounts."8
Upon appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to set
aside an order of sale, sale of property, and other relief entered after a
final decree of partition, the Second District Court of Appeal held that
it had the discretion to treat the appeal as being interlocutory under
rule 4.2 of the Florida Appellate Rules. 54
An order reinstating a cause of action which had been dismissed
with prejudice was not reviewable as being a final judgment or order
granting a new trial, but was treated as an attempted interlocutory ap-
peal.855
347. Id.
348. Ross v. City of Miami, 205 So.2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
349. Id.
350. Ford v. West Florida Enterprises, Inc., 210 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
351. WKAT, Inc. v. Rubin, 221 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
352. A-1 Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Vilberg, 222 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
353. Carberry v. Foley, 206 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
354. Rivers v. Eliman, 206 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
355. Harrison v. Anclote Manor Foundation, 205 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
[A] trial court after issuing an interlocutory order retains
jurisdiction over a cause and has power to do all things neces-
sary to enable it to reach the final judgment. It follows that a
trial court has jurisdiction to amend or modify an interlocutory
order any time before it enters final judgment."'
Rule provisions relating to the time for a motion for new trial or rehear-
ing or a motion to alter or amend a judgment are inapplicable to inter-
locutory orders. An appeal from an interlocutory order is not subject to
dismissal for failure to appeal from a prior interlocutory order 8
XVIII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The test of sufficiency of a complaint in ... a [declaratory
judgment] proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that
the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in
accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is
entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Thus, sustaining of the
adequacy of the complaint only lays the foundation for the case
to be heard upon its merits and does not connote a determi-
nation as to who should prevail. 8 8
The party seeking declaratory relief must show doubt or uncertainty
as to whether some right, status, immunity, power, or privilege exists,
and that he "has an actual, practical, and present need for a declara-
tion.,,8 5
9
The controversy must be bona fide, "justiciable in the sense that
it flows out of some definite and concrete assertion of right, and there
should be involved the legal or equitable relations of parties having
adverse interests with respect to which the declaration is sought." 6 '
When a racing association sought a determination of the plaintiff's rights
as to racing dates allocated to horse tracks in the state and sought to
have declared unconstitutional a statute providing preferential treatment
for the horse track having produced the largest amount of tax revenue
during the proceeding year of its operation, the plaintiff was held to
have had a "justiciable, cognizable, bona fide and direct interest in the
result sought by the action . . . .,131 The rights and privileges of the
association under the statute were considered to be in jeopardy and
the interest of the parties antagonistic.86 '
356. A-1 Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Vilberg, 222 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (foot-
note omitted). See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b) and (g), in regard to provisions dealing with
final judgments.
357. A-1 Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Vilberg, 222 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
358. Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 210 So.2d 750,
752 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) (citation omitted).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 752-53 (citations omitted).
361. Id. at 753.
362. Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In an action for declaratory relief seeking to declare a rule of the
Florida State Board of Dispensing Opticians imposing a limitation on
the place of optical dispensing to be illegal and unconstitutional, plain-
tiffs were held to be without sufficient legal status to obtain the relief
sought." ' Plaintiffs were nonresidents of the state, and neither was
licensed in Florida as an optometrist, optician, or otherwise. Their
only basis for having a right to the relief sought was a conditional and
ambiguous offer made by the plaintiffs to set up and operate an optical
department in a Miami department store. The court believed that
plaintiffs were really seeking "a premature advisory opinion" and that
the declaratory judgment statute was not designed to provide relief in
these circumstances. 64
XIX. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Injunctions
A temporary injunction should not be granted without requiring
bond, and the trial court was correct in vacating the injunction when it
had been granted without setting bond. 6'
The general function of a temporary injunction is to preserve
the status quo until full relief can be granted following a final
hearing....
* '**In order to support the granting of a temporary in-
junction it is also necessary for plaintiff to demonstrate ir-
reparable injury; injury which cannot be redressed in a court
of law. Mere loss of business because of a competitor will not
suffice. 6 '
Accordingly, in an action by a bus service to prevent operation of a
competitor over a certain portion of the state's turnpike, where the
defendant had operated the business for three years, "the effect of the
injunction was to disturb rather than preserve the status quo"36 7 and,
absent a showing of irreparable damage, it was reversed.
Issuance of a temporary injunction was held to be clearly erroneous
when the enjoined person was never made a party to the suit and an
attempt on her own motion to become a party was denied. The requisite
bond was never posted, nor did the enjoined party have notice or an
opportunity to be heard.368 The issuance of the injunction was also at
variance with the principle
363. Florida State Bd. of Dispensing Opticians v. Bayne, 204 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
364. Id. at 38.
365. Rich v. Rich, 214 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610.
366. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So.2d 365, 366 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1968) (footnotes omitted).
367. Id. at 366.
368. Levy v. Gourmet Masters, Inc., 214 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). See also FLA.
R. Cxv. P. 1.610.
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that courts of equity are without jurisdiction to enjoin execu-
tion upon a judgment obtained at law simply upon the ground
that such judgment was irregular and erroneous. A judgment
which appears on its face to be regular can not be collaterally
attacked absent a showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction,
either of the subject matter or over the person of the defen-
dant.369
B. Certiorari
It has long been the law of the State of Florida that
common law certiorari is a discretionary writ and will not
ordinarily be issued by an appellate court to review interlocu-
tory orders in a suit at law. Such a writ will only be issued in
exceptional cases limited to instances where the lower court acts
without or in excess of its jurisdiction; where the interlocutory
order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and
may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subse-
quent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be
inadequate.870
A petition for common-law certiorari to review an interlocutory order
granting the respondent's motion to produce income tax returns when
the petitioner claimed loss of wages as an element of damages was
denied. The court held that if the order was in error, it was not so
flagrant as to be a departure from the essential requirements of law, nor
was it a substantial, fundamental error.
8 7 1
When the error alleged in a petition for writ of certiorari is proce-
dural, the petition must demonstrate that it was a fundamental error.
8 72
"Non-fundamental errors of procedure cannot be the subject of a pro-
ceeding for writ of certiorari even though the error might be reversible
on appeal. 8 s7
8
Common-law certiorari was held to be unavailable to review inter-
locutory orders granting the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint
because the petitioners failed to show that the orders "constitute[d] a
departure from 'essential requirements of law' or that petitioners [were]
... without an adequate remedy by appeal should they suffer an adverse
final judgment. 8 7 4
The writ of certiorari "is essential, even indispensable, to the com-
plete and effective exercise of the prescribed jurisdiction of [the Su-
preme] Court to decide all appeals from final judgments passing on the
validity of a statute.18 7
5
369. Levy v. Gourmet Masters, Inc., 214 So.2d 82, 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
370. Gollsneider v. Stein, 214 So.2d 628, 629 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) (citations omitted).
371. Id.
372. Gulf Cities Gas Corp. v. Cihak, 201 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
373. Id. (citations omitted).
374. Marlowe v. Ferreira, 211 So.2d 228, 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
375. Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So.2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1968).
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C. Prohibition
"[P]rohibition will not issue from a superior court to an inferior
court or tribunal unless the judgments and orders of the latter are
reviewable by the former."8 7 6 Thus, when there was a matter before
the Florida Industrial Commission in respect to which a writ of prohi-
bition sought "was not one reviewable by the Circuit Court, the latter
was without jurisdiction to issue the peremptory writ.18 77
D. Mandamus and Quo Warranto
Petitioners sought an alternative writ of mandamus against the
Secretary of State and various county canvassing boards to compel the
boards to recount ballots cast in a primary election. The supreme court
held that it did not have jurisdiction under section 4 of article V of the
Florida Constitution since the section
"proscribes the jurisdiction of this Court in original mandamus
proceedings to those cases" when a state officer, board, commis-
sion, or other agency authorized to represent the public gener-
ally or a member of such board, commission or other agency is
named as respondent.87
The court quoted from its decision in State ex rel. Winton v. Town of
Davie,8 79 holding that the constitutional provision limits the power of
the court to issue writs of quo warranto to those situations " 'when a
state officer, or a state commission, or other state agency is the respon-
dent.' ,13o Having found no case since Winton which abrogated that
case's construction of the provision with regard to an original proceeding
in mandamus, the court declared that it had no alternative but to dismiss
the petition.8"'
376. Johnston v. State, 213 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
377. Id. at 439.
378. Petit v. Adams, 211 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1968) (emphasis added).
379. 127 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1961).
380. Petit v. Adams, 211 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1968).
381. Id. The original petition had only named one County Canvassing Board as re-
spondent, and it was amended to include as respondents, the Canvassing Boards of several
other counties.
